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Abstract. Using a sample of 37 finance companies listed under the finance segment of 
Bursa Malaysia, we examined the impact of the revision to Malaysian code on corporate 
governance on audit committee attributes and firm performance. Our result suggests that 
audit committee attributes significantly improved after the Code was revised. In addition, 
the coefficient for audit committee and risk committee interlock has a significant negative 
relationship with Tobin‟s Q in the period before the revision to the Code and before the 
global financial crisis. The negative direction of the result is contrary to agency theory 
which suggests that separating directors on subcommittees will create information 
asymmetry between the directors and lead to poor coordination in the decisions of the 
committees thereby negatively affecting firm performance. 
Keywords. Corporate governance, Audit committee, Independent directors, Expert 
directors, performance, Executive Membership, Directors Interlock, Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance. 
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1. Introduction 
he Securities commission of Malaysia (SCM) as one of the regulatory 
authorities ensures that companies conduct their activities in line with best 
practice of good corporate governance. This is shown by the issue and 
continuous revision of the MCCG to ensure that companies in Malaysia have good 
corporate governance. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 and prior corporate 
scandals affected investors‟ confidence in capital market and necessitated the move 
to enhance the corporate governance practice by companies in Malaysia. This 
move was started with the setting up of a finance committee on corporate 
governance to deal with the issue of establishing codes and principles to guide the 
companies. One of the outcomes of the committee was the introduction of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in March 2000. The finance committee 
also established the Malaysian institute of corporate governance which operates as 
a nonprofit public company limited by guarantee. This move was aimed at 
restoring confidence of investors in the capital market. Compliance with the Code 
developed from this initiative was initially voluntary but later made mandatory by 
the revised listing requirements of Bursa Malaysia in 2001. The main aim of the 
first version of the Code was to establish governance structures and processes for 
the effective running of companies. Such structures and processes include board 
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composition, recruitment and remuneration of directors and the establishment of 
board subcommittees (http://www.sc.com.my). Since coming into existence, the 
Code has been revised twice in 2007 and 2012 to enhance its significance and 
make it in line with the changing needs of the market.  
The revision to the Code in October 2007 was done to improve the quality of 
the board of public listed companies (PLCs) by emphasizing on the enhancement 
of the role of board of directors, stipulating the role of nomination committee (NC), 
qualification required for people to be appointed as directors and strengthening the 
audit committee (AC). The revised Code also mandated companies to have internal 
audit function; required AC to be composed of only non-executive directors and 
required the board of directors to be responsible for ensuring adherence to the 
scope of internal audit functions (http://www.sc.com.my).The second revision 
issued in March 2012 was aimed at „strengthening board structure and 
composition, recognizing the role of directors as active and responsible 
fiduciaries’ (MCCG, 2012, p.1). It provides recommendations for best practices of 
corporate governance and its recommendations serve as a general guide for listed 
companies in Malaysia. The revised Code was aimed at enhancing board 
effectiveness through board leadership and independence. The Code also 
encourages companies to disclose high quality and timely information as a way of 
showing respect to the shareholders right (http://www.sc.com.my).The emphasis on 
good corporate governance by the MCCG could be noticed by the 
recommendations of the code for the separation of board leadership and the 
requirement for the establishment of various board committees. The revised 
version of the Code emphasized the need for the board to ensure companies 
conduct their activities in an ethical and sustainable way, recommends that the 
board should have a competent secretary that will assist it in discharging its 
function and emphasized on measures to manage risk as well as the need for more 
quality disclosures (http://www.sc.com.my). 
The first version of the code encouraged the establishment of governance 
structures and processes for the effective running of companies as well as 
composition of the board, recruitment and remuneration of directors and the 
establishment of board committees were also emphasized. The second version 
emphasized on the enhancement of the role of the board of directors, strengthening 
the AC, stipulating the role of NC, qualification required for people to be appointed 
as directors, internal audit function, required AC to be composed of only non-
executive directors and stressed on adherence to the scope of internal audit 
functions. Some of the areas focused on by the third version of the code includes; 
strengthening board structure and composition recognizing the role of directors as 
active and responsible fiduciaries, encourages high quality and timely information 
disclosure, risk management, strengthen relationship between firm and 
shareholders and recommendation for companies to have qualified company 
secretary. As could be observed from the above discussion the MCCG was issued 
and revised in order to ensure that companies have governance mechanisms that 
are capable of safeguarding the interest of various stakeholders especially in 
finance companies where there is high agency problem coupled with complex 
operations, structures and products. This has shown the commitment of the 
Securities commission of Malaysia in ensuring sound capital market which will 
enhance the confidence of investors in the market and attract more capital flow into 
the market and ensure that Malaysia remains one of the best destinations for 
foreign capital. 
The position of finance companies in an economy is central to the 
accomplishment of the economic goals of the country (Kim & Rasiah, 2010). 
Therefore, poor governance in finance companies could come with great loss to the 
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entire economy in the form of huge expenditure to rescue the finance companies 
and failure to accomplish economic goals that are accomplishable only through the 
financial system (Thillainathan, 1999). The finance sector performs different roles 
towards the proper functioning of the economy. The growth and development of 
companies in an economy is facilitated by the financial sector especially in 
emerging economies (Mahmoud, 2011). They mobilize savings from the people 
and sectors with surplus funds and channel them to the sectors where they are 
needed, facilitate various payments services for goods and services and finance 
development of business (Turlea, & Mocanuand Radu, 2010). In addition, finance 
companies are characterized by high leverage, opaque operations and tendency of 
instability (Westman, 2009). Furthermore, the need to safeguard the savings of 
depositors, investments of shareholders and bondholders, maintain the stability of 
the payment system and reduce risks emphasizes the importance of the stringent 
regulation of the financial institutions (Merton, 1995). 
The recent global financial crisis had an impact on several companies and 
economies all over the world and the nature of the impact differs from one country 
to another (Atik, 2009). The benefit of good corporate governance practices in 
finance firms was re-emphasized by this financial crisis. The crisis began in 2007 
and led to the filing for bankruptcies by many financial institutions in different 
parts of the world especially the West. This made authorities to intervene with 
various rescue packages to save the troubled companies. This led to the injection of 
the public funds into such institutions to prevent total collapse of the system. In 
addition, authorities set up different committees to look into reasons behind such 
problems and to come out with recommendations that have become laws and 
regulations to guide the governance of financial institutions (Becht, Bolton & 
Roell, 2012). The existence of a sound financial system is needed for the 
attainment of the status of a developed economy (Becht et al, 2012). Such sound 
financial system mobilizes and allocates funds to various sectors of the economy 
that helps to lower the cost of capital to the firms, boost capital formation and 
stimulate productive activities and growth in the economy (Becht et al, 2012). In 
addition, financial institutions provide maturity transformation by investing very 
illiquid deposits into risky projects with a long payback period. This function 
enables the bank to reduce the risk to investors and depositors by polling of 
resources and diversifying investment portfolio of short-term deposit and long-term 
investment (Westman, 2009). 
Although there are a lot of studies on AC, however, the studies largely focused 
on developed countries and results of the studies are contradictory. In addition, 
there are few studies on the impact of MCCG on corporate governance and firm 
performance and the studies that compared the period before and after the MCCG 
were issued and revised are few. Therefore, considering the role of the audit 
committee as the most important subcommittee of the board, this paper examines 
whether AC attributes have impact on firm performance in both the period before 
and after the MCCG was revised. Secondly, the paper examines whether the 
revision to MCCG had impact on AC attributes. The code was initially issued in 
2000 after the Asian financial crisis and was revised in 2007 and 2012. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews related literature and 
develops hypotheses. Section three narrates the research methodology. Section four 
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2. Literature Review 
The Malaysian code on corporate governance (revised, 2007, 2012), BMB 
listing requirements (2007) and the corporate governance guide issued by central 
bank mandated all listed and licensed companies in Malaysia to form an AC of the 
board composed of non-executive directors and should comprise not less than three 
members with a majority of INED. Finance companies were the first companies to 
have AC in Malaysia which was made a requirement by the central bank in 1985 
prior to other public companies (Sori, 2005). The requirement for the establishment 
of AC for other companies was introduced in 1993 (Yatim, 2009).The development 
of AC as a subcommittee of the board was given a boost by the Smith report of 
2003 in the UK. The AC is to assist the board in discharging its responsibilities 
with respect to finance and accounting functions. It is responsible to ensure that the 
internal control function in the company is adequate and that the internal control 
function is discharged effectively. In addition, the AC is responsible for fair and 
transparent reporting, ensuring effectiveness of internal and external audit and 
ensuring that related party transactions are reported (MCCG, 2007). In addition, the 
AC is responsible for the appointment, resignation, fees and dismissal of the 
external auditors (MCCG, 2007). The major function of audit committee is to 
monitor financial performance and ensure integrity of financial reporting (Yatim, 
2009). The listing requirements of Bursa Malaysia (2007) and the corporate 
governance guide issued by the central bank requires that audit committee should 
include at least one member with accounting qualification or accounting experience 
or finance industry experience. The presence of an expert on the AC is to ensure 
that the AC performs its monitoring functions effectively (Brown et al., 2011). 
Karamanou & Vefeas (2005) documented a positive relationship between audit 
committee and firm performance. Mangena & Chamisa (2008) found that the 
existence of audit committee in a company helps to enhance compliance with the 
regulatory requirements and thereby reduce the possibility of the suspension of the 
firm from the South African stock exchange. Furthermore, presence of AC in a 
company was found to be associated with less change in external auditor by 
companies (Kunitake, 1983) and the appointment of a reputable external auditor as 
a result of the network of the members of the committee (Kunitake, 1981). Audit 
committee may be unable to perform the monitoring role effectively due to lack of 
expertise and time and because of the additional responsibilities imposed on the 
committee by the regulatory bodies (Yatim, 2009). Through its function which 
includes meeting with both internal and external auditors, audit committee ensures 
the release of high quality financial information (Klein, 1998). Aldamen, Duncan, 
Kelly, McNamara & Nagel (2011), reported that small AC composed of directors 
with experience and financial expertise and interlock of directors is positively 
associated with performance based on market measure of performance.  
2.1. Agency Theory 
Agency relationship results from the separation of ownership and control which 
was brought by the industrial revolution that led to the emergence of large 
organizations and therefore the delegation of responsibility and authority (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Bhandari, 2010). In addition, agency problem resulting from the 
self-interest of the managers is more complex in the finance companies as there are 
multiple interests the company needs to address. The shareholders as the primary 
principals appoint managers to act as agents to manage the business on their behalf. 
This separation of ownership and control could lead to the agents taking decisions 
that are not in the interest of the principal. 
2.2. Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1. Committee Composition 
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The independence of AC members enhances the financial reporting quality and 
reduces the incidence of restatement (Abott, Parker & Peters, 2004). Independence 
of the AC members enhances monitoring due to the absence of any association 
between committee members and the management and because the directors will 
monitor effectively the activities of management in order to protect their image and 
enhance their chances of getting further appointments (Carcello & Neal, 2003). 
Furthermore, the independence of AC enhances the effectiveness of the committee 
in monitoring by improving internal control and by providing internal audit with an 
opportunity to communicate to a committee composed of independent directors 
(Raghunandan, Read & Rama, 2001). Abott, Peters & Raghunandan (2003) 
reported that independent AC is associated with greater scope of work of the 
external auditor which could help to detect fraudulent practices. Lam (1975) found 
that management and auditor are more honest in reporting when there is AC of 
independent directors. Beasley (1996) found the presence of independent AC to be 
negatively related with financial statement fraud. Klein (2002) reported that AC 
with a majority of non-independent directors is associated with increase in 
abnormal accruals, implying that AC composed of mainly INED is more effective 
in monitoring financial reporting and related functions. The independence of AC 
improves the powers of the committee and reduces agency problem and chances 
for expropriation by insiders (Yeh, Chung & Liu, 2011). Although active AC 
composed of INED enhances performance through enhanced monitoring and by 
providing independent channel for the external and internal auditors to 
communicate any issues, some prior studies have shown that independence of AC 
does not enhance independence of the external auditor (Gul, 1989) while mixed 
results were reported by Cottel & Rankin (1988). Therefore our fist hypothesis is 
stated as follows:    
H1 There is a significant relationship between audit committee composed of 
independent directors and firm performance.     
 
2.2.2. Independent Committee Chair 
Woidtke & Yeh (2013) reported that audit committee composed of mainly 
independent directors and the presence of an independent chair enhances the 
quality of financial reporting. Akhigbe & Martin (2006) reported that independent 
AC chair enhances quality of reported financial result and fraudulent financial 
reporting is reduced when there is independent chair. In addition, better monitoring 
of accounting and financial reporting activities of the company will be ensured 
when committee chair is independent (Tao & Hutchinson, 2012). Although 
committee chair enhances committee independence, such independence may not 
bring the desired improvement in enhancing the effectiveness of the committee in 
monitoring the activities of management if the CEO is involved in the directors‟ 
selection (Cacello et al., 2011).  They further added that independence of the 
committee chair alone will not enhance the confidence of the investors in the 
companies‟ financial statement but the presence of independent directors in 
addition to independence of the committee chair will ensure that the market has 
confidence in the reported figures of companies especially where the ownership is 
c o n c e n t r a t e d .  T h u s  w e 
hypothesized as follows; 
H2 There is a significant relationship between independent chair of audit 
committee and market firm performance. 
 
2.2.3. Expert Directors 
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The need for the presence of expert directors on the AC was emphasized as a 
result of the recent financial crisis and the previous corporate scandals (Güner, 
Malmendier & Tate, 2008). Davidson, Xie & Xu (2004) report that market 
valuation of a firm is positively related with appointment of a director with finance 
expertise on AC. Ghafran & Sulliva (2012) found that investors value the presence 
of AC and they perceive the appointment of expert director on AC positively. 
According to Dickins, Hillson & Platau (2009) the reliability of the financial 
statement of a company to analysts is enhanced when the AC has a member with 
financial expertise. This is the case because the presence of finance expert will 
enhance the quality of the financial report. Krishnan and Visvanathan found that 
expert directors on audit committee reduce the audit fees charge by the external 
auditors. Therefore we hypothesized as follows:   
H3 There is a significant relationship between audit committees’ expertise and 
firm performance. 
 
2.2.4. Executive Experience 
Evidence from prior studies has shown a positive relationship between AC 
composed of directors with prior experience and firm valuation (Aldamen et al., 
2011). The industry experience of directors may be more beneficial to a small 
finance company in its early stage of development since the directors could serve 
„as a resource to management’, by providing a link to outside resources such as 
contacts and connections. While an established company at the declining stage of 
its development and with dispersed shareholdings may benefit more from directors 
with technical or financial expertise who will concentrate on monitoring of the 
company (Carcello et al., 2011, p. 22). Thus, the following hypothesis was tested; 
H4 There is significant relationship between presence of NED with executive 
experience on audit committee and firm performance.  
 
2.2.5. Executive Membership 
The presence of executive directors on board committees will reduce 
information asymmetry between the executive and non-executive directors and 
provide the committees with valuable and high quality inside information which 
could be difficult to obtain by outsiders (Aguilera et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
the presence of executive especially the CEO and CFO on AC could hinder the 
effective functioning of the committee with regards to financial reporting activities 
(Carcello, 2011). Since the CEO and CFO were involved in most of the prior 
accounting frauds (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Neal, 2010) their presence on 
the committee could mean a weak control environment and the need for more 
vigilance by the external auditor (Carcello, 2011).  Therefore our fifth hypothesis is 
stated as follows:   
H5 There is a significant relationship between membership of executive on 
audit subcommittee and firm performance. 
 
2.2.6. Interlock of Directors    
The multiple membership of directors on subcommittees reduces information 
asymmetry, enhances coordination and communication among the subcommittees 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hou & Wang (2013) found that interlock of directors 
enable directors to provide more effective monitoring of the executive due to their 
reputation and expertise which they gained from serving on different committees. 
Interlock of directors on board subcommittees will enhance the coordination and 
communication among subcommittees in a firm thereby reducing the chances of 
decisions that will contradict each other and ultimately enhance performance (Tao 
& Hutchinson, 2012). Therefore multiple memberships on committees by 
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directors‟ especially monitoring committees will result in better performance 
through more efficient coordination of the appointments, compensation package, 
risk level and the monitoring of financial reporting process (Laux & Laux, 2009). 
Hoitash & Hoitash (2009) on the other hand found negative impact of interlock of 
directors on firm performance. Therefore our last hypothesis is as follows:   
H6 There is a significant relationship between dual membership of directors on 
audit and other monitoring committees and firm performance. 
 
3. Methodology 
The sample comprise of all finance companies listed on the finance sector of the 
main board of Bursa Malaysia which consist of 37 companies spread across the 
various segments of the finance sector.  The observation period covers 2004 to 
2006 for the period before revision while the period after the revision comprise of 
year 2009 to 2011. The study used secondary data that was collected from the 
annual report of the companies available from the website of Bursa Malaysia or the 
company‟s website. In addition to the annual reports, financial information about 
the companies was obtained from Bloomberg data source. The annual report was 
used to obtain information on corporate governance variables while information on 
the dependent variable and control variables was obtained from financial 
information available from Bloomberg database. Multiple regression analysis was 
used to analyze the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
Specifically, the study was operated based on the following research model; 
 
Fpit= α + β1 INED it + β2 CINED it + β3 FE it + β4 EE it+ β5 EP it+ β6 AC_RMC it + β7 
AC_RC it+ β8 AC_NC it + β9 FS it +β10 LEVit   + YD it+ ε it   (1) 
 
The variables in the research model were measured as follow: 
 
Firm Performance=  returns on assets (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q. 
INED= proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the 
committee 
CINED= dummy variable of one if subcommittee chair is independent director zero 
otherwise 
FE= proportion of directors with accounting qualification or finance industry 
experience on the subcommittee  
EE= proportion of directors with executive experience on the subcommittee 
EP= proportion of executive on the committee 
AC_RMC= proportion of directors on both audit and risk subcommittee to total number 
of directors on the audit subcommittees 
AC_RC= proportion of directors on both audit and remuneration subcommittee to 
total number of directors on the audit subcommittees 
AC_NC= proportion of directors with dual membership of audit and nomination 
subcommittee to total number of directors on the audit subcommittee 
FS = Log of total assets 
LEV= Ratio of total debt to equities 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The result of the descriptive statistics was used to test the assumptions of 
regression analysis. As indicated by the skewness and kurtosis values, the data for 
all the variables under the model are normally distributed since the skewness and 
kurtosis values are within the ±3.00 and ±10.00 range. In addition, the group 
normality test was performed and the values obtained are 0.823 and 3.232 for 
skewness and kurtosis respectively which indicates that the data is normally 
distributed. The result from the Q-Q plot indicates that the assumption of linearity 
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is fulfilled since the Q-Q plot indicates that the values fall within ±3.00 threshold. 
The result indicates that there are companies with AC composed of 100% 
independent directors while some have no independent director and an average of 
69% and 83% for the period before and after the revised code respectively. This 
indicates that more independent directors are appointed to AC after the revised 
MCCG was issued. The proportion of AC chaired by an independent director has 
also increased from 94% before the revised code to 98% after the revised code. 
This indicates that the revision of the code has made an impact on the composition 
of the AC. The result also indicates that more directors with expertise are appointed 
to AC as shown by the increase from a maximum of 75% to 100% with an average 
of 32% and 42% for the period before and after the revision respectively. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the period before the revision to MCCG   
     CC  CINED       FE       EE      EP AC/RMC AC/RC AC/NC 
 Mean  0.696  0.945   0.320  0.298  0.115  0.204  0.512  0.574 
 Median  0.667  1.000   0.333  0.333      0.00  0.000  0.666  0.666 
 Maximum      1.00      1.00   0.750  0.800 0.333  1.000  1.000  1.000 
 Minimum 0.00 0.00      0.00  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00  0.00 
 Std. Dev.   0.210  0.227   0.237  0.247  0.151  0.339  0.341  0.351 
 Skewness -1.474 -3.944   0.193  0.306   0.590  1.392 -0.228 -0.538 
 Kurtosis  7.324  16.55   1.996  2.067  1.435  3.483  1.867  2.109 
OBS. 111      111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Notes: ROA=return on assets measured as EBIT divided by total assets, CC=committee composition 
defined as the proportion of Independent directors to total number of directors on AC, CINED=chair 
independent non-executive director defined as a dummy variable that takes one if committee chair is 
independent zero otherwise, FE=finance expertise measured as the number of directors with 
accounting expertise or finance industry experience divided by the total number of directors on AC, 
EE=executive experience measured as the number of directors with executive experience divided by 
the total number of directors on AC, EP=membership of executive defined as the number of executive 
directors on AC divided by total number of directors on AC, A/RC=audit/remuneration committee 
interlock, A/RMC=audit/risk committee interlock, A/NC=audit/nomination committee interlock, 
interlock is defined as the number of directors on AC and other monitoring committee divided by 
total number of directors on AC, FS=firm size (log of total assets), LEV=leverage measured as total 
debt divided by equity. 
 
The percentage of directors with executive experience on AC has changed from 
a maximum of 80% to 100%, a minimum of zero and an average of 29% and 27% 
for the period before and after the revision. Although based on the average for the 
two periods there is decrease, there is an increase in case of the maximum 
percentage in the period after compared to the period before the revision. In 
addition, less number of executive directors are appointed to AC this is indicated 
by an average of 11% in the period before to one percent in the period after the 
revision as recommended by the revised code. The proportion of directors with 
dual membership on AC and other subcommittees ranges from a minimum of zero 
to a maximum of 100% for both periods. In case of interlock of directors on AC 
and risk management committee, the average has increased from 20% to 26% for 
the period before and after respectively. The average for AC and remuneration 
committee interlock has also increased from 51% to 55% while average for AC and 
nomination committee interlock has increased from 57% to 66% for the period 
before and after the revision respectively. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the period after the revision to MCCG 
 INED CINED FE EE EP A_M A_C A_N 
 Mean  0.8340  0.981  0.423  0.272  0.012  0.269  0.551  0.663 
 Median  0.8333 1.00  0.333   0.250  0.00  0.00  0.600  0.666 
 Maximum  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.333  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 Minimum  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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 Std. Dev.  0.1963   0.133   0.246   0.283  0.062  0.366  0.319  0.335 
 Skewness -1.4303    7.246   0.126   0.695  4.978  0.933 -0.205 -0.689 
 Kurtosis  6.6231  53.51   2.568   2.446  25.78  2.333  2.072  2.372 
Obs. 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
 
The result of correlation analysis indicates no co linearity between the predictor 
variables since none of the vicariate correlation exceeds 0.7.Therefore, there is no 
multicollinearity problem. The heteroskedasticity test also indicates that the null 
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is rejected indicating the presence of 
heteroskedasticity problem in the model. White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error was used to correct the heteroskedasticity problem. Autocorrelation 
was corrected by using the white diagonal method. 
4.2. Multiple Regression Analysis for the Period Before and After 
Revision to MCCG Based on ROA 
The result of the Hausman‟s test presented in table three indicates that REM is 
suitable for the period before while FEM is appropriate for the period after. The 
adjusted R
2
 (0.0199 and 0.7969) based on ROA for both periods indicates that the 
independent variables explain approximately two percent and 80% of the variation 
in ROA. The f-statistics is 1.1867 for the period before and 9.9940 for the period 
after. The corresponding p-value is highly significant or lower than the alpha value 
of 0.05 in case of the period after while it is insignificant for the period before the 
revision and the crisis. In terms of the individual predictor variables none of the 
variables is significantly related with ROA in the period after the revision while 
executive experience is significant (p<0.1) and positive and firm size is significant 
(p<0.01) and negatively related with ROA in the period before the revised code. 
 
Table 3. Multiple regression for the period before and after the revision 
 Period before Period after 
Constant  0.0634(3.5417)***  2.3257(1.6973)* 
Composition  0.0044(0.2236) -0.1725(-0.0839) 
INED -0.0014(-0.4530) -1.1864(-0.4509) 
Finance expertise -0.0120(-0.7489)  0.9509(0.5965) 
Executive experience  0.0259(1.6625)*  0.2776(0.1759) 
Executive membership -0.0079(-0.2791) -0.3221(-0.0451) 
Firm size -1.1128(-2.5333)*** -0.3802(-0.3787) 
Leverage  0.0193(1.4145)  1.0030(0.5247) 
A_RMC  0.0245(1.8554)*  0.3952(0.2479) 
A_RC  0.0159(1.2590)  21.096(1.2818) 
A_NC -0.0183(-1.4608) -4.3247(-0.8308) 
Year dummies -0.0059(-1.1865) -0.0501(-0.1658) 
Year dummies -0.0037(-0.7307) -0.0422(-0.1374) 
R2  0.126877   0.885549 
Adj. R2  0.019964   0.796941 
F-statistics  1.186736   9.994061*** 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.608559   3.253233 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of the 
variables has been given in the table presented earlier. 
 
4.3. Multivariate Regression Analysis for the Period Before and After 
Revision to MCCG Based on Tobin’s Q 
As indicated by the result, the adjusted R
2
 obtained is approximately 46% and 2% 
for the period before and after the revision and the financial crisis. The f-statistics 
obtained is 2.9409 and 1.1291 while it is significant at one percent in the period 
before, it is insignificant in the period after the revision. In terms of the individual 
variables, dual membership of directors on AC and risk committee is significant 
and negatively related with Tobin‟s Q at five percent level in the period before the 
revision. The negative direction of result is contrary to agency theory which 
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suggests that interlock of directors on subcommittees will reduce information 
asymmetry among the directors about the activities of various committees thereby 
enhancing coordination among the committees and their activities. The negative 
sign is however in line with findings by Hoitash & Hoitash (2009) who argued that 
interlock of directors on committee will create conflict as a result of the conflict in 
objectives of the committees. The remaining variables are statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 4. Multivariate regression for the period before and after the revision of MCCG 
based on Tobin’s Q 
 Period before Period after 
Constant  0.007855(3.211020)***  0.009211(2.821944)*** 
Composition  0.001744(0.779707)  0.003927(1.126581) 
INED -0.000102(-0.251324) -0.006398(-1.489284) 
Finance expertise -0.003075(-1.418343)  4.87E-05(0.020639) 
Executive experience  0.001115(0.487080)  0.000980(0.410375) 
Executive membership  0.001265(0.262989) -0.003021(-0.355816) 
Firm size  0.055403(0.915813)  0.000422(0.204457) 
Leverage  0.001113(0.546259)  0.001175(0.628306) 
A_RMC -0.004644(-2.239421)**  0.000681(0.296505) 
A_RC -0.001498(-0.951260)  0.034819(0.937889) 
A_NC  0.000561(0.380899) -0.023419(-2.524480)*** 
Year dummy -0.000827(-1.826424)*  0.000483(0.588140) 
Year dummy -8.18E-05(-0.168866)  0.001294(1.567675) 
R2  0.694830  0.134762 
Adj. R2  0.458570  0.015418 
F-statistics  2.940952***  1.129193 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.143050  1.812205 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The definition of the 
variables has been presented in the earlier tables. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Using a sample of 37 listed finance companies, this paper investigates the 
impact of audit committee attributes on firm performance based on the data for the 
period before and after the MCCG was revised. The result indicates that interlock 
of directors on audit and risk committee influence market valuation of firms 
negatively. The result is contrary to agency theory which suggests that separating 
directors on committees will create information asymmetry between the directors 
and lead to poor coordination in the decisions of the committees thereby negatively 
affecting firm performance. Overall, the result has shown an improvement in the 
corporate governance of finance companies in the period after the revision when 
the result for both periods is compared. Therefore, regulators should constantly 
review the corporate governance code to make it in line with market needs. The 
result has provided evidence on the impact of revision to MCCG on corporate 
governance in the finance companies and the impact on the performance of the 
firms. The study is limited to only listed finance companies and examined only 
some attributes of the audit committee. Future studies could examine other 
companies in other sectors or other locations. In addition, future studies could look 
at committee attributes which were not examined in this study such as personal 
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